India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) has been hailed as one of the country's most creative social initiatives. Since the program was begun only recently (in 2004-05) there is a need to assess household access to this program and persistence of benefits to households not just in one year but over time. Using a unique panel data set for 2007-08 and 2009-10 for the Indian state of Rajasthan, this paper analyzes the transitions into and out of the NREGS. It models the impact of such transitions on earnings of workers as well the determinants of such transitions. To the best of our knowledge this is the first study of this kind. Several policy conclusions are advanced.
During its first year of operation National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) involved an expenditure of $4.5 billion and was expected to generate 2 billion days of employment. NREGS's performance is also crucial to the success of the Millennium Development Goal of halving global poverty by 2015. In the budget of 2010-11 expense earmarked for NREGS was Rs. 401 billion (>$8 billion).
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Against this backdrop it is important to ask both how much benefits have accrued from this program to eligible workers and whether these benefits have persisted over time.
The first issue can be addressed using household level cross-section data and some dimensions have been addressed in a series of papers (Jha et al. 2012b , for employment and Jha et al. 2011 , for nutritional impact). The second issue can only be addressed using 2 For recent evidence on performance of NREGS at the national level see Jha and Gaiha (2012a) .
In addition, detailed ethnographic interviews were conducted in 2008-09 in the period between the first and second surveys. About 20-25 respondents belonging to a cross -section of villagers and block level officials/political leaders were interviewed in a subset of eight villages selected according to the political affiliation of the village president (sarpanch).
Since the sarpanch is elected along non-political party lines, we found his/her political affiliation during the larger household survey. Fifty percent of the villages had sarpanches affiliated to one party, and the other half were affiliated to the opposing party. Two trained interviewers in each state team who spoke the local language and were cognizant of the requirements of ethnographic research conducted the interviews. The interviews contain anecdotes and examples of corruption, the decision making process of the panchayat (village governing body), the process of choosing NREGS projects, the influence of political parties on village level issues, migration rates and agricultural wages in the village, the impact of caste and income on the ability to influence decisions, the information available to the respondent about the NREGS, and awareness of social audit, right to information, among others. 6 We also conducted focus group sessions in 25 worksites per state. These ethnographic interviews provide us with the perceptions of the beneficiaries, policymakers and village level elites on the dynamics of power and the impact of the NREGS.
III. Results
The performance of the NREGS, as revealed by government statistics, has been disappointing and, if anything, has deteriorated over time. For 2007-08 and 2009-10 Table 1 presents data on actual expenditure against planned expenditure for India and Rajasthan as well as summary statistics for various states of India. Both actual expenditure as a percentage of planned expenditure and work completed have gone up. Table 1 here.
The actual performance of NREGS in terms of employment has, however, been disappointing. Table 2 shows data on average person days of employment under NREGS per household as well as the proportion of households who had competed the promised 100 days of work in the first nine months of 2009-10. 6 The interviewees included the village sarpanch, ex-sarpanch, deputy sarpanch, gram sevak, NREGS assistant, caste leaders, panchayat members, village development committee members, political activists from the leading parties, NGOs in the village, the Patwari, moneylender, ration shop owner, worksite supervisor, NREGS beneficiaries at the worksite, and individual asset creation beneficiaries. At the block level, we interviewed the Block Development Officer, the NREGS program officer, the junior engineers, ward panchayat members, and the Pradhan. We also interviewed the member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA Table 3 here.
The following points about The results are depicted in Table 4 . Table 4 here.
The top panel of We next investigate the distributional shift in the poverty status of those households.
The second panel of Table 4 The third and fourth panels of Table 4 We then investigated whether households who moved out of the NREGS are better off. To determine this, we see how distribution of CPIAL adjusted income net of NREGS and PCME changed over this period. This is documented in Table 7 . were used to test whether distribution of these variables is same (i.e., median is equal) over time.
Results are also supplemented by Stochastic Dominance test (Atkinson, 1987) . 7 It tests the equality of matched pairs of observations by using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test (Wilcoxon 1945) . The null hypothesis under Wilcoxon signed-rank test is that distributions for both the years 2007-08 and 2009-10 are the same. 8 It tests the equality of matched pairs of observations. The null hypothesis is that the median of the differences is zero. 9 The test enables ordinal poverty comparisons for a range of poverty thresholds and a class of poverty indices. 10 These details are not reported here to conserve space but are available from the corresponding authors.
To measure changes in the per capita income over time, we construct two variables as follows: We define percentage increase in MPCE by subtracting its value for base year We find that there is no significant difference in the percentage change in MPCE or PCMINNE for Type I and Type II households. This suggests that there isn't a significant essential assumption of ANOVA is the equality of variances of the dependent variable across the types of household. When this assumption is violated, the reported p-value from the significance test may be too liberal (yielding a higher than expected type I error) or too conservative (yielding a lower than expected type I error). In our analysis, Bartlett's test for equal variances suggests that variances are significantly unequal (results are not reported here but can be obtained from the corresponding author upon request). As a remedy of violation of this assumption, W and F * robust one way ANOVA is performed. Both w-test and F * are more robust to violations of homogeneity of variances than traditional F-test. However, commands for these tests in STATA do not permit any types of sampling weights and, therefore, we rely on OLS regression with robust standard errors. income, the lower is the percentage change with respect to the base year's per capita income.
However, other control variables are insignificant.
We then investigated whether changes in the share of per capita income from agricultural and non-agricultural sources (net of NREGS earnings) lured or kept households from participation in NREGS. For this, we summarize some of the descriptive statistics (such as mean, standard deviation and median) for share of per capita income from agricultural sources (agriculture, live-stocks and agricultural wages) in total per capita income for base Table 9 reports descriptive statistics and pair-wise comparisons of means for these shares and percentage changes in these. Table 9 here. Now, to examine the significance of pair-wise differences of means among four types of households in these shares as well as percentage changes in them, we employ Bonferroni multiple-mean comparison test along with one-way ANOVA. Table 10 depicts t-statistics for the multiple comparison tests for the means of shares and their changes from bothagricultural and non-agricultural sources. Table 10 here.
Our key conclusions are as follows. In the base year (2007-08) the mean share of per capita annual income from agricultural sources in total per capita income for all other households as compared to the households who never participated, were significantly higher. Definitions of these variables are given in annex 
Thus every sub-vector of  enters every marginal effect, both through the probabilities and through the weighted average that appears in j  .These values can be computed from the parameter estimates and standard errors are computed using the delta method.
Econometric Results
The estimation results are given in Tables 11 and 12. Table 11 contains coefficient estimates.
Note that the base (reference or omitted) case is Type I households, leaving Type II, III and IV households for detailed analysis. The model specification is validated by Wald chi-square statistics at 1 percent level of significance. Table 12 reports their corresponding marginal effects. As the latter are more meaningful, we shall confine our comments to them.
Tables 11 and 12 here
(1) Type I households As compared to others, the probability of never participating is significantly lower in SCs, STs and OBCs households. Higher land ownership in the base year increases the likelihood of never participating in NREGS. However, increase in land holding over time does not have a significant effect. Ratio of village level NREGS to agricultural wage rates in the initial year reduces the probability of never participation in NREGS. However, increase in the ratio does not have a significant effect on it. Increase in the village level per capita annual earnings from non-agricultural sources net of NREGS earnings in the base year increases the probability of never participation under NREGS. However, percentage change in village level per capita annual earnings from non-agricultural sources net of NREGS earnings in current year relative to the base year does not have a significant effect on the likelihood of never participation. Effects of household composition in terms of share of adults (both initial percentages and change) and village distance from the NREGS work sites in 2007-08 are statistically insignificant.
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(3) Type III households
There is no significant difference in the likelihood of newly entered participating households (Type III households) among SCs, STs and OBCs as compared to 'others' social group.
Also, household composition in terms of proportion of adults both initially and subsequent change do not increase or decrease the probability of first time entrance in NREGS. Increase in the household's land ownership in the base year (but not increase over time) increases the likelihood of a household to participate first time in the scheme.
Though initial year's ratio of village level NREGS to agricultural wage rates does not alter likelihood of a household to participate first time in the scheme significantly, increase in its value over time has significant and positive effect on the probability of a household to Neither initial year's ratio of village level NREGS wage to agricultural wage ratio nor increase in its value over time have significant effects on the probability of a household's continued participation. The higher the village level per capita annual earnings from nonagricultural sources net of NREGS earnings in the base year, the lower is the probability of continued participation in NREGS. However, the percentage change in village level per capita annual earnings from non-agricultural sources net of NREGS earnings in current year relative to the base year does not have a significant effect on the likelihood of households to continue their participation in the scheme. Initial year's village distance from the NREGS work sites is not statistically significant.
Thus, the role of incentives in participation in NREGS is confirmed. Workers exit from NREGS when they see better economic opportunities elsewhere in the village economy while others enter the scheme because of the lure of remunerative wages.
V. Explaining the dynamics of participation and exit from the NREGS
The ethnographic study conducted in the period between the first study and the panel study illuminates some of the perceived dynamics triggered by NREGS. The patterns that emerge from these interviews are consistent with the above analysis. This explains why those belonging to Type II households exited NREGS in 2010. Exits could have occurred due to several reasons: a) Workers found more lucrative work as agricultural laborers. There was considerable agreement that wages in the agricultural sector had increased as a result of NREGS (to keep pace with the NREGS wages). The perception in the villages is that NREGS, whose wage rates are pegged to the statutory minimum agricultural wages, has been instrumental in increasing agricultural wages. Perhaps the explanation is as follows: In Rajasthan, the worksites functioned all year round, and not just in lean seasons. If the worksite was functional during the agricultural season, these Type II households (who had increased their landholdings) may have exited since they needed to work on their own lands and also needed to pay the hired workers.
In the qualitative survey, several farmers complained that they were unable to get labor during the harvest season because of ongoing NREGS work, and that the agricultural wages had gone up.
c) Worked in non-farm jobs: Type I and Type II households were more likely to live closer to markets (which we take as a proxy for a town) than the other two types of households.
If we take the distance to the market as a proxy for distance to the nearest town, the figures show that for all three types of households, the distances to the nearest market have decreased. For instance, the distance as 12.31 km in 2008 and is now 10.45 km for Type III households, while it was 10.15 km in 2008 and is now 9.28 km for Type II households. Type I and Type II households are closer to the nearest market (7.24 and 9.28 km respectively) than Type III and Type IV households (10.45 and 10.70km, respectively).
With the boom in the construction industry in the state since 2008, the opportunities for skilled and unskilled laborers increased and were more lucrative than working on the NREGS. Type III households, on the other hand, were more likely to live further away from the market, had less connectivity, and less access to such jobs. These perceptions need to be examined more systematically.
Among Type IV households, the reasons for continuing to stay within the program can be traced to their use of NREGS as an additional source of income. The story seems to be that of a Type IV household that has seen a marginal improvement in its circumstances from the NREGS. The figures from the website of the Rajasthan government on the NREGS indicate an increase in individual beneficiary schemes. About 113468 projects were taken up in 2008-9 for land development and provided irrigation facilities to those who owned land and qualified as individual beneficiaries and increased to 156468 projects in 2010-11. 12 Another perception of the interviewees in several villages was that migration had reduced since 2007-8. In addition, our panel data in Table 4 reveal that almost 50 percent of Type III households were STs, and were first time entrants into NREGS. Hence, the story that emerges is one where females were sent to NREGS worksites while males went to find better paying jobs in the city. However, since all these are based on perceptions, we need to assess whether the migration has actually reduced, and if so, is it because people prefer to work in NREGS projects or is it because there has been an expansion of lucrative non-NREGS (farm and non-farm jobs) in the villages. At this time this is an open question.
What is clear from the ethnographic survey is that the general perception is that the NREGS has increased wage rates in other jobs (farm and non-farm).
VI. Conclusions
Using household level panel data for the Indian state of Rajasthan this paper has considered the important issue of how the benefits in terms of employment and earnings from a workfare program vary over time. It has described movements in and out of the NREGS for various groups of households in the sample as well as the impact such transitions have on earnings.
We also modelled the determinants of such transitions; and the dynamics of participation and exit from the NREGS. Hence, this paper provides the first systematic analysis of the dynamics of entry, participation in and exits from the NREGS. A major policy implication of our analysis is that incentives to participation matter-lack of remunerative employment opportunities. A related issue therefore is that the strong case against workfare on the grounds that public support in the form of guaranteed employment induces dependence on it and discourages job search and investment in human capital is exaggerated, if not mistaken. This of course should not be taken to imply that all is well with NREGS. Targeting is often unsatisfactory and leakage of funds and earnings is scandalous. Raising awareness of local communities about the potential benefits of this scheme and mobilizing them for greater accountability and transparency are crucial for ensuring that the benefits accrue to the needy as their economic circumstances deteriorate. Determinants and Persistence of benefits from NREGS: Panel Data Analysis for Rajasthan, India Those who participated in both the years. ***,**,* refer to significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. t(m) denotes for t-statistics with m degrees of freedom. Z refers to Z-statistics and P refers to the probability of number of positive outcome (say X) larger than the observed positive outcome (say x in a sample of n with probability of success p) = Binomial (n, X >= x, p = 0.5). Positive values of t and z suggest that base year 2007-08 values (mean or median) are significantly higher than those in 2009-10. 
